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NOTES
ConstitutionalLaw
SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT OF STATE STATUTE AS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE

Introduction
Desire to know and understand the basis upon which the judiciary decides the constitutionality of statutes poses an intriguing
problem in analysis and synthesis, for an exhaustive study of it
would involve a passage from the strict school of canons of interpretation to the hopelessly loose school of "corn flakes and judicial
disposition." Though many might frown upon a study which at one
end, at least, trails off into sheer speculation, nevertheless it is of
obvious importance to legislators, lawyers, and clients of lawyers
to know what grounds the courts will move upon when a litigant
has challenged the constitutional validity of a statute. The task is
surely not an impossible one, for in human affairs there is a consistency that leads us to expect to find a more or less constant
method of proceeding when the problem of statutory constitutionality has arisen.
In order to deal most effectively with this problem, the study of
it in this Note is limited to a "key situation," the determination by
the United States Supreme Court of the constitutionality of a state
statute. Superficially, the solution here might appear to be a simple one: on the one hand, there is the state law which may be read
on its face to determine its meaning and scope, and on the other
hand there is the federal constitution to which the statute may
then be compared to see if it violates any of the constitutional provisions. Yet, at this point, one must ask whether the Supreme
Court should simply judge the state statute on its face. Two other
possibilities appear: the state act's validity may be determined in
the light of an interpretation of the statute by the state supreme
court, or in the light of the acts of the litigant to whom the statute
has been applied. It is the purpose of this Note to determine whether the Supreme Court makes use of these other two possibilities,
and if so, in what cases the Court will make use of them rather
than judge the state act on its face alone.
It should be noticed - if one thinks of the decision of a statute's
constitutionality as a two-step process: (1) determination of the
(684)
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scope and meaning of the act, (2) determination whether the act
as thus construed violates the Constitution - that the problem to
be treated here concerns construction of the act preparatory to
seeing whether or not it then violates a provision of the Constitution.
Construction of the Statute by the
State Supreme Court
Where the supreme court of a state has interpreted the meaning
of a state law, the United States Supreme Court will consider itself bound by the state's decision as to the scope and requirements
of the act,' even though the Court might think the state interpretation incorrect. 2 This general rule and the reason for it were succinctly 3stated by Chief Justice John Marshall in Elmendorf v.
Taylor:
This court has uniformly professed its disposition, in cases depending
on the laws of a particular state, to adopt the construction which
the courts of the state have given to those laws. This course is
founded on the principle, supposed to be universally recognized,
that the judicial department of every government, where such department exists, is the appropriate organ for construing the
legislative acts of that government.

It makes no difference that the face of the statute does not reveal
the meaning attached to it by the state court, for, "the construction becomes part of the statute as much as though it were found
in appropriate words in its text."- Indeed, by virtue of the state
court's interpretation, a state act that might otherwise be struck
down as being too vague and indefinite can be saved.5
This deference to the state court's interpretation is so pronounced that the Supreme Court will follow inconsistent gyrations of that interpretation. Thus it will overrule its own adjudication which had been based upon construction of a state statute
Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953); United States v.
339 U.S. 87 (1950); 11 Am. JuR., Constitutional Law § 102 (1937).
2 See Supreme Lodge, Knights of Pythias v. Meyer, 265 U.S. 30, 32-33
(1924). There was no question of constitutionality of the state act here,
but the conclusiveness of the state court's interpretation in the constitutionality cases seems to be but one application of a more general rule that the
Supreme Court considers the state court's interpretation of a state act as
authoritative in all types of litigation.
3 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 67, 70 (1825).
4 Georgia Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Decatur, 295 U.S. 165, 170 (1935). Accord:
Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953), at 402: "This state interpretation is as though written into the ordinance itself."
5 Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
1
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made in conformity to the decision of the state supreme court on
the statute's meaning, so as to conform to a different construction
afterward adopted by the state. 6 And in some cases the Court has
ruled that it will not decide the validity of a state act in advance of
a state court interpretation of the meaning and requirements of
the act; 7 it will wait for the state court to adopt a construction of
the statute rather than to assume in advance that a construction
will be adopted which will render the act unconstitutional. Consequently the case will be remanded to the district court with directions to hold in abeyance pending construction of the statute by
the state courts. The reason for this is that the state court's decision will be conclusive, and a determination by the Supreme
Court in advance of that decision would simply be guess work as
to what the state court will say. In Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman
Co.,8 the Court stated, ".

.

. no matter how seasoned the judg-

ment of the district court may be, it cannot escape being a forecast
rather than a determination." In Spector Motor Co. v. McLaughlin,9 the Court also gave as a basis for the "wait and see" policy it
adopted, the maxim of avoiding decision of constitutional questions as much as possible.
However, it must be noticed that these cases' ° involving the
"wait and see" rule are all suits in equity, and as the Court emphasized in RailroadComm'n v. Pullman Co.," equity is an appeal
to the discretion of the chancellor. Thus, the "wait and see" rule is
premised upon the discretion inherent in equity, and cannot be
said to be an absolute rule.' 2
To the general rule of finality of a state's interpretation of the
scope and requirements of its acts, three exceptions are sometimes
stated. First, mere characterization of the nature of a state law by
a state court, as distinguished from a decision concerning the
meaning of the act, is not conclusive at all upon the United States
Green v. Neal, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 188 (1832).
Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242 (1953); Shipman v. DuPre, 339
U.S. 321 (1950); AFL v. Watson, 327 U.S. 582 (1946).
8 312 U.S. 496, 499 (1941).
9 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944).
10 See note 7 supra.
"
312 U.S. at 500.
12 For a case in which the weight of circumstances swung the discretion
of equity the other way, see Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U.S. 163 (1930).
Note, however, that the question here was one of authorization under the
state act, not validity of the act. Also, and more importantly, there was
involved here impairment of a contract obligation by a state. The importance
of this will be seen below. For a case not in equity where the "wait and see"
policy was rejected, see Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472 (1949).
6
7
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3
Supreme Court.1
This exception is most frequently employed in
tax cases..
Secondly, several early cases contain dictum to the effect that
the state court's interpretation is not binding on the Supreme
Court when there is a "federal question" involved. 14 What constitutes a "federal question" is not entirely clear, for all these
-cases except one 15 held that no federal question existed, and
hence the state court's interpretation controlled. If a "federal
question" arose simply because the Court had to decide the validity
of a state act under the federal constitution, then the rule giving
the state court primacy in deciding the meaning of state acts would
be reduced to naught, for the exception would swallow the rule.
It seems clear, however, that the "federal question" must arise in

'3
Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts, 279 U.S. 620 (1929). See also, Gregg
Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U.S. 472, 478 (1932).
14 Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 163 U.S. 142, 152-153 (1896) (dictum);
Gormley v. Clark, 134 U.S. 338, 348 (1890) (dictum); Norton v. Shelby
County, 118 U.S. 425 (1886) (dictum).
15 The case in which the Supreme Court actually found a "federal
question," Scott v. McNeal, 154 U.S. 34 (1894), turned upon this issue:
did the local law mean that letters of administration could be issued
upon the estate of a temporarily missing, but not deceased person?
Though the state court said "yes," the Supreme Court ruled to the
contrary, and went on to say that the act would violate due process if the
state's interpretation were adopted. In answer to the plea that the state's
decision was conclusive, the Supreme Court held, at 154 U.S. 45:
"Upon a writ of error to review the judgment of the highest court
of a State upon the ground that the judgment was against a right
claimed under the Constitution of the United States, this court is no

more bound by that court's construction of a statute . . . of the

State, when the question is whether the statute provided for the
notice required to constitute due process of law, than when the
question is whether the statute created a contract which has
been impaired by a subsequent law of the State... . In every
such case, this court must decide for itself the true construction of
the statute."
In effect the Court seems to say that a federal question is raised whenever
'the validity of a statute is attacked on the ground that it violates the
federal constitution, and in such cases the state court's construction of the
meaning of the statute is not conclusive on the Supreme Court. This decision
reveals a momentary misunderstanding of the general rule of finality of the
state court's construction: that rule has nothing to do with whether the
statute as construed violates the Constitution. It is confined to the actual
construction of the statute. In Scott v. McNeal, supra, the Court failed to
distinguish between the question of the meaning of the statute where
the state's decision should be determinative, and the question of constitutionality of the statute as thus construed, an area where the Supreme
Court is, of course, the final judge.
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determining the meaning of the state act, and has no reference to
deciding the constitutionality of the statute after its meaning is
decided. For instance, in Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois,'6 the Court
held that no federal question existed and hence the state court's
construction of the act was binding on the Supreme Court; it
then found that the statute violated the Constitution. Perhaps the
"federal question" exception finally means little more than a reemphasis that just as the state's construction of state acts is final,
for similar reasons the Supreme Court controls the final determination of the meaning of federal acts.
It is the third exception which is most important. A's stated in
Coombes v. Getz,'7 it concerns Article I, § 10 of the Constitution,
the contract impairment clause:
The decision of the supreme court of a state construing and
applying its own constitution and laws generally is binding upon
this court; but that is not so where the contract clause of the Federal
Constitution is involved. In that case this court will give careful
and respectful consideration and all due weight to the adjudication
of the state court, but will determine independently thereof whether
there be a contract, the obligation of which is within the protection
of the contract clause, and whether that obligation has been impaired; and, likewise, will determine for itself the meaning and
application of state constitutional or statutory provisions said to
create the contract or by which it is asserted an impairment has
been effected.

To let the state court have final authority on such questions as
whether its law established a contract, when the state is sued on
the basis that a subsequent act has impaired a contract set up by
the first act, would place too great a temptation before the state to
serve its own purposes at the expense of hapless plaintiffs. Accordingly, were it not for this exception, ". . . the constitutional
guaranty could not properly be enforced."' s

The general rule whereby the state court's construction of the
meaning of a state statute will be deemed controlling by the Supreme Court when deciding the constitutionality of that statue,
and the exceptions to that rule, are definitely fixed in constitutional law. Their certainty stands in sharp contrast to the confusion that surrounds the question of judging a state law in the
light of the acts of the party who attacks the constitutionality of
the law.
16 163 U.S. 142 (1896).
17 285 U.S. 434, 441 (1932), and cases cited therein. Accord, Phelps v.
Bd. of Education, 300 U.S. 319 (1937).
18 Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U.S. 163, 176 (1930).
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Judging the Statute in the Light
of the Acts of the Defendant
L Conflict in Decisions
It is impossible to read many cases involving the constitutionality of state laws under the federal constitution without having
the vague feeling that the Supreme Court is handling these cases
in an inconsistent manner. The basis for this uneasiness lies in the
language the Court employs in disposing of the state law cases, as
the following excerpts indicate:
We think that the ordinance is invalid on its face. 19
But this court must deal with the case in hand and not with
imaginary ones. It suffices, therefore, to hold that, as applied to cases
like the present, the statute is valid.20
If on its face the challenged provision is repugnant to the due
process clause, specification of details of the offense intended to be
charged would not serve to validate it .... It is the statute, not the
accusation under it, that prescribes the rule to govern conduct and
warns against transgression?'
Usually, however, the only proper approach takes into consideration
both the facts of the case and the construction which the state has
placed on the challenged law ... And in the absence of facts in
the light of which the statute may be construed, we have said the
proper procedure is2 2not to pass on whether it conflicts with First
Amendment rights.

These quotes are indicative of the confusion to be found within
the cases when seeking to ascertain whether the Supreme Court,
in determining the constitutionality of a state act, judges the
statute on its face or in the light of the acts of the defendant.
Though the outlines of the problem may well remain hazy, its
main shape can best be seen in the Court's employment of hypothetical situations, ie., situations which might arise under the
statute but which are not presented in the concrete facts of the
case then before the Court, as a basis for striking down the statute.
On the one hand, a series of well known cases has been decided on
the basis that the statutes involved were by their terms such as to
make possible activity that would violate the federal constitution,
without particular regard to the incongruity that the facts of the
cases which actually brought the statutes before the Court were
not so evidently in conflict with the Constitution. In Saia v. New
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 '(1938).
20 Yazoo & Miss. R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1912).
21 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
22 Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 304 (1951) (dissent by J. Jackson).
19 Lovell v. City of
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York,23 for example, the Court struck down a city ordinance24
forbidding the use of loud speakers to broadcast in public places
local chief of police. Exwithout first getting permission from the
5
plaining its decision, the Court said: 2
But to allow the police to bar the use of loud-speakers because
their use can be abused is like barring radio receivers because they
too make a noise ....
Any abuses which loud-speakers create can be controlled by

narrowly drawn statutes. When a city allows an official to ban them
in his uncontrolled discretion, it sanctions a device for suppression
of free communication of ideas. In this case a permit is denied because some persons were said to have found the sound annoying.
In the next one a permit may be denied because some people find
the ideas annoying. Annoyance at ideas can be cloaked in annoyance
at sound. The power of censorship inherent in this type of ordinance

reveals its vice. (Emphasis added.)

Notice where the emphasis lies. The Court's attention is directed
to the can be, what could be done under the s "atute,and not to the
is, what in actuality has been done under the-statute in this case.
As pointed out in the dissent, the facts of Saia v. New York reveal that there very probably was an abuse of the right of free
speech by the defendant.
The Court in Wuchter v. Pizzutti,26 ruled unconstitutional on
due process grounds a New Jersey statute which provided that all
non-resident motorists, by using New Jersey roads, constituted
23 334 U.S. 558 (1948). See also: De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937);
Montana Co. v. St. Louis Mining and Milling Co., 152 U.S. 160, 169-70
(1894), the Court quoting with approval the following language from
Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N.Y. 183, 188 (1878): "The constitutional validity of
law is to be tested, not by what has been done under it, but what may by

its authority be done."

Cases involving the constitutionality of federal laws also show that the
Court has judged statutes on the basis of what they hypothetically
authorize, and not upon the factual situation which has occurred under
their authority. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Butts v.
Merchants Transp. Co., 230 U.S. 126 (1913); James v. Bowman, 190 U.S.
127 (1903); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875). As in Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., supra, the question of separability of the parts of a statute

will sometimes arise.
It should be noted that the range of hypothetical situations which may
be called upon to serve as the basis of judging the act's validity is not
unlimited. A speculative situation must be reasonably provided for on
the face of the statute before it will be considered. Toomer v. Witsell, 334
U.S. 385, 393-94 (1948).
24
It is well established that a city ordinance is state action, and for the
purposes of determining its constitutionality, like a state statute. Lovell v.
City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938).
25 334 U.S. at 562.
26 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
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the Secretary of State agent for service in any suit arising out of
an accident. The statutory defect was said to be in the failure of
the statute to require the Secretary of State to mail a notice of suit
to the non-resident motorist, or in some other way to reasonably
provide for notice. Yet, it was undisputed that the defendant in
fact had been given notice by personal service in Pennsylvania.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ruled that the requirement of
giving notice had to expressly appear in the statute:
But it is said that the defendant here had actual notice by service
out of New Jersey in Pennsylvania. He did not, however, appear
in the cause and such notice was not required by the statute. Not
having been directed by the statute it can not, therefore, supply
constitutional validity to the statute or to service under it.27
In practical effect, one may sa3' that the case was decided on the
hypothetical basis of a state of facts where no notice had been
t
given.
To be sure, the use of a hypothetical does not necessarily mean
that the actual facts of the case are not fundamental in judging the
statute. The hypothetical may be used simply as an analogy to
highlight the import of the actual fact situation. This seems to have
been the case in Schneider v. State,2s where the Court alluded to
hypothetical situations. "If it [the state law] covers the petitioner's
activities it equally applies to one who wishes to present his views
on political, social or economic questions." 29 Yet the Court concluded by saying, "we do hold, however, that the ordinance in
question, as applied to the petitioner's conduct, is void ...
,
(Emphasis added.)
But where the hypothetical is used as a basis for decision of the
case, as it was in the Saia and Wuchter cases, then it would seem
apparent that the statute is being construed simply on its face,
even though the fact situation might lead one to believe that the
statute, by virtue of being applied to these particular facts involved, should be differently construed. For sake of clarification
of this principle, consider the Wuchter case. The New Jersey statute said nothing about a requisite of notice or of some procedure
reasonably calculated to give notice. Yet the statute had been applied to a case in which notice was given as a matter of fact. Would
it have been unreasonable for the Court to construe the statute as
requiring adequate notice, in light of the facts of the case? Certainly if the highest state court of New Jersey had previously so
Id. at 24.
308 U.S. 147 (1939).
2
Id. at 163.
30 Id. at 165.
27
28
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construed the statute, the Supreme Court would have judged it
as containing such requirement.
On the other hand, the Court has refused in several cases 3- to
consider hypothetical situations under the statute, limiting its construction of the statute by the particular acts of the defendant. Upholding an Iowa statute to the effect that a foreign citizen who had
never been in Iowa, but who had set up an office in that state for
the sale of securities and so had become amenable to suit by service upon the agent in charge of the office, the Supreme Court
closed its opinion with these words:
So far as it affects appellant, the questioned statute goes no
farther than the principle approved by those opinions permits. Only
rights claimed upon the present record are determined. The limita32
tions of § 11079 under different circumstances we do not consider.
In an earlier case, Yazoo & Miss. R. R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 33
a Mississippi statute providing that common carriers be penalized
twenty-five dollars for failure to settle claims for lost or damaged
freight within sixty days was declared constitutional. Counsel for
the railroad contended that the statute might be valid as to reasonable claims, but it had to be struck down since by its terms it
was not limited to reasonable claims. This argument was emphatically rejected, and the Court construed the statute in the light
of the facts of the case, which involved a reasonable claim and
only a reasonable claim: "But this court must deal with the case
in hand and not with imaginary ones. It suffices, therefore, to hold
that, as applied to cases like the present, the statute is valid." 34
Thus the Doherty and Jackson Vinegar decisions certainly involve a divergence from the Court's approach to the state statutes
in the Saia and Wuchter cases.
Several other instances point up the conflict. It has been stated
as a general rule that the constitutionality of a statute is to be de31 Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935); Mountain Timber
Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917); Chicago, Terre Haute & Southeastern
Ry. v. Anderson, 242 U.S. 283, 288 (1916), where the Court said, "The
statute has only been applied in favor of a contiguous land owner ...
So limited we think its validity must be admitted. . . ."; Yazoo & Miss.
R.R. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217 (1912); Castillo v. McConnico,
168 U.S. 647 (1898).
This was also the basis of the dissenting opinions in Saia v. New York,
334 U.S. 558 (1948), J. Frankfurter saying at 565, "State action cannot be
found hypothetically unconstitutional," and J. Jackson opening his dissent
at 566 with, "Let us state some facts which the Court omits."; Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 725-27 (1931) (dissent).
32 Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 628 (1935).
33 226 U.S. 217 (1912).
34 Id. at 219-20.
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termined by its practical operation and effect. S S Again, it is the
substance of the act and not its form that is controlling in determining its validity.3 6 And a statute valid as to one set of facts may
be invalid as to another.3 7 Many times the Court has concluded
that a statute is constitutional or unconstitutional - not on its
face - but rather as applied to the facts of the case in controversy.38 All of these shibboleths would indicate that the Court has
looked to the acts of the defendant in judging the statute.3 9
In deciding the constitutionality of criminal statutes, however,
the Supreme Court has stressed that it is to be judged on its face,
so that those who are subject to it will not have to guess at what is
prohibited by the statute.40 And when the facts of the case are not
properly set up, as when the pleadings simply follow the language
of the statute, then of course the statute can only be judged on its

face. 41
35 Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 570 (1949): "We
deal with the taxing plan as an entirety as we find it in operation and
pass only on the constitutionality of that which the State has asserted
power and purpose to do."; Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S.
219, 237 (1917): "The question whether a state law deprives a party of
rights secured by the Federal Constitution depends not upon how it is
characterized, but upon its practical operation and effect."
36 Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 550, 555 (1935) [quoting
Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U.S. 688, 698 (1895)]: "The substance
and not the shadow determines the validity of the exercise of the power.";
Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U.S. 472, 476 (1932): "We regard the substance rather than the form, and the controlling test is found in the
operation and effect of the statute as applied and enforced by the State."
37 Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 402 (1941): "A law which is constitutional as applied in one manner may still contravene the Constitution as
applied in another."; Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405,
415 (1935): "A statute valid as to one set of facts may be invalid as to
another. A statute valid when enacted may become invalid by change in
the conditions to which it is applied."
38

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940: "...

and applied to the appellants...
(1939): "....

.";

as construed

Schneider v. State, 308 US. 147, 165

as applied to the petitioner's conduct.....

39 But see Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), and Bailey v.
Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911), which seem to suggest a second way of
considering the facts of a case, i.e., as typical of the situation arising under
the statute, instead of as confined to these particular facts of this particular
case.
40 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948); Lanzetta v. New
Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
41 United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1947) (federal act); Williams
v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898).
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11. Reality of the Conflict
At times the language of the Supreme Court which leads one to
believe that the statute is judged either on its face, or with consideration of the defendant's acts, seems rather trifling. The question must inevitably arise, is the difference not mere verbalism?
Opinions such as that of Justice Roberts in Hague v. C10 42 would
seem to lend credence to such a view, for Roberts ruled that the
record disclosed the statute's effect in fact to be one of suppression
of free speech, and at the same time he declared the statute void
on its face. Certainly it would be rather easy to interchange by
mistake the words "on its face" for "as applied" (and vice versa),
or to use such language inadvertently, and it cannot be denied
that in some decisions at least, such undoubtedly has been the
case.
Yet the conflict noted above is not to be so easily explained in
its entirety. Surely the propositions - construe the statute on its
face alone, or judge it with reference to the particular facts of the
case - are not one and the same. Their practical difference is sufficent to determine the outcome of the case, as pointed out above
in reference to Wuchter v. Pizzutti. There are two other possible
explanations of the conflict which also would place it on a more
or less superficial level. First, perhaps the "face versus facts" dispute is simply the end result of judicial language being employed
to camoflage pre-judged results with the flavor of logical analysis.
Again it cannot be gainsaid that this might occasionally be the
case. Secondly, perhaps one approach or the other is selected as a
means to aiding the cause of certain categories of preferred cases.
There is a good deal of evidence to support this view, and to understand its import, one must turn to the decisions concerning First
Amendment rights.
HII. PersonalLiberty Cases
In the past twenty-five years, the Supreme Court has declared
several state statutes unconstitutional on the grounds of violating
the freedoms of speech, press, religion, or assembly. A great many
times, the statute was found to be invalid on its face. 43 These de307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939).
43 Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337

U.S. 1 (1949) (Note that the statute was declared unconstitutional "as
construed and applied," at 337 U.S. 5;" nevertheless it appears from the
rest of the decision that the Court shuns the actual facts of the case, and
looks only to the face of the statute.); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558
(1948); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Thornhill v. Alabama,
310 U.S. 88 (1940); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); De Jonge
v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
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cisions have spotlighted the dichotomy between the "facts" approach and the "face" approach to a statute, for Justice Jackson
dissented vigorously to three of these cases;' in each dissent
he urged that the Court look at the facts of the case when
judging the statute, as he felt the facts showed a clear abuse of
the First Amendment right by the defendant. Criticizing the "face
of the statute" approach, Jackson pointed out that it is very easy to
read a statute so as to permit some constitutional abuse, but very
difficult to write one which will not be open to the same objec45
tion.
Why have so many of these personal liberty cases been decided
upon a "face of the statute" basis? Perhaps the answer lies in the
preferred position in which First Amendment rights have been
regarded by the Supreme Court. In Saia v. New York, the Court
declared:
Unless we are to retreat from the firm positions we have taken in
the past, we must give freedom of speech in this case the same preferred treatment that we gave freedom of religion in the Cantwell
case, freedom of the press in the Griffin case, and freedom of speech
and assembly in the Hague case. 46

And also:
Courts must balance the various community interests in passing
on the constitutionality of local regulations of the character involved
here. But in that process they should be mindful to keep the
freedoms of the First Amendment in a preferred position.4 7

That the Court should hold these personal liberty rights in special
esteem brings the problem into sharper focus, for correspondingly
the Court would be especially jealous to strike down any statute
that would endanger these liberties.
It seems apparent that an effective way to favor these rights
would be to do just what the Court has done, judge the constitutionality of a First Amendment statute on its face. Jackson was
very probably correct in saying that the facts of these cases show
abuse of the rights, so it becomes necessary to avoid the facts if
a harsh policy toward these statutes is to be carried out. This can
be done by use of the "face of the statute" approach. Thus, to some
44 Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 295 (1951); Terminiello v. Chicago,
337 U.S. 1, 13 (1949); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 566 (1948).
45 340 U.S. at 304.
46 334 U.S. at 561. Accord: Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 106 (1949)
(dissent by J. Rutledge); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 98 (1940).
Contra, Kovacs v. Cooper, supra, at 90-96 (concurring opinion-not too
convincing).
47 334 U.S. at 562.
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extent at least, the Supreme Court appears to choose that method
which will afford greatest protection to rights considered especially important.
This conclusion is supported by the racial discrimination
cases, 4s if one may assume that the Court is alert to see that racial
discrimination by the state be abolished. In such cases the state
law is normally fair enough on its face, and it is only when construed in the light of the facts of the case that its evil is seen. Consequently, the Supreme Court has decided, as in Oyama v. California, that:
In approaching cases, such as this one, in which federal constitutional rights are asserted, it is incumbent on us to inquire not
merely whether those rights have been denied in express terms,
but also whether they have been denied in substance and effec t.'

IV. Confinement of the Conflict
If the above analysis could be said to exhaust the conflict between the "face of the statute" and the "facts of the case" judgments, then from the nature of the basis for the divergence, one
would not expect the conflict to be ever harmonized. Yet it appears
that the problem is indicative of a greater confusion, and consequently the solution must be sought elsewhere.
Justice Brandeis, in his dissenting opinion in Dahnke-Walker
50
Co. v. Bondurant,
made a distinction that may well go to the heart
of the issue. The majority decision in Dahnke-Walker ruled invalid a state statute prescribing the conditions upon which foreign
corporations could do business in Kentucky. To reach this decision
the Court obviously construed the statute in the light of the acts
and position of the party against whom the statute was asserted:
the foreign corporation's only transactions in Kentucky were interstate commerce, so the act as applied was declared unconstitutional. Brandeis emphatically denied that the case involved any
question of constitutionality of the statute at all, saying that the
only question was of the constitutionality of its application. He
pointed out that the word "apply" is used in two different senses
with statutes: (1) to describe that which is within the scope of
the statute - this is construction of the statute, (2) to refer to the
making operative process for the statute -this is application of
the construed statute. The validity of a statute, as distinguished
48 Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948); United States v. Reynolds,
235 U.S. 133 (1914); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
49 332 U.S. 633, 636 (1948).
50 257 U.S. 282 (1921).
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from its application, is in question only when the power to enact

it" . . . as it is by its terms, or is made to read by construction, is
fairly open to denial and denied." 5' Carried to its logical conclusion, this position taken by Brandeis would seem to mean that
only the face of the statute (or the face as amended by a state
court's construction of the statute) is to be judged if the validity
of the statute itself is questioned. If the application of the statute is
questioned, then the particular facts of the case are to be referred
to.
This analysis, based on the distinction Brandeis made, would do
a great deal to eliminate the present conflict in the cases as to when
the statute will be judged on its face alone. It lacks support, however, when pinpointed to concrete cases, for Dahnke-Walker is
not the only decision in which the Court has turned to the particular facts of the case in judging the constitutionality, not of the
application of the statute, but of the statute itself.52 In its rough
outlines, though, the analysis may be helpful, if only for the sake
of clarity. Following the distinction it draws between construction and application, the problem area may be narrowly outlined
by dividing the cases into (1) those where the statutory scope,
requisites, and meaning are perfectly clear, and (2) those where
they are in doubt. In the first instance the statute itself will be
judged on its face alone, 53 and only when the validity of the application of the statute is in question will the Court refer to the
particular facts of the case. In the second instance, the Court in
some cases will construe the statute itself on its face, but in others
it will judge the statute in the light of the particular facts of the
case. The application of the statute will be judged just as in the
first instance, with regard to the particular facts. Thus the conflict
is limited to the situation where a state statute not clear as to its
scope, meaning, or requisites, is challenged in itself, rather than in
its application.
Conclusion
Though the conflict may be drawn into focus through this process of limitation, its solution does not become any the more im51 Id. at 295 & n. 1, quoting from Baltimore & Potomac R.R. v. Hopkins,
130 U.S. 210, 224 (1889).
52 See, e.g., Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623. (1935).
53 Even Justice Jackson has admitted that there are cases in which it
is proper -for the Court to judge the statute on its face, alone. "It may
happen that a statute will disclose by its very language that it is impossible
of construction in a manner consistent with First Amendment rights."
Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 304 (1951) (dissent).
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mediate. Whichever side of the question is taken, difficulties immediately present themselves. If a state statute is to be judged on
its face, then a great many state laws will be endangered. Justice
Jackson's observation in Kunz v. New York,5 that it is easy to
read a statute so as to allow some abuse of constitutional rights
and equally difficult to write one free from such defect, is worthy
of serious consideration. On the other hand, judging a statute in
the light of the particular facts of the case hardly seems likely to
result in much insight into congressional intent, which traditionally is what we should seek out in construing the statute. And
such a practice would seem to leave the status of the act's constitutionality as susceptible to change as would be the diverse fact
situations which might bring the act before the Court.
Nevertheless it seems safe to assume that First Amendment
cases in the future will use a "face of the statute" approach, and
the discrimination cases will continue with a "facts" approach. As
to other cases, it is impossible to know. This uncertainty is echoed
in the lower federal courts.55 If there has been a construction of
the statute by the state supreme court, the Court may be expected
to rely upon it rather than to judge the statute on its face. Whether
it will likewise construe the statute in view of the particular facts
of the case rather than judge merely upon the face of the law is a

question which at present only the Supreme Court can answer.
Robert P. Gorman

See note 45 supra.
55 Compare Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 32 F. Supp.
964, 985 (D. Mont. 1940), rev'd per curiam, 311 U.S. 606 (1940): ".. . it must
be borne in mind that the facts peculiar to each case control the decision in
that case," with Central Natl Bank v. McFarland, 20 F.2d 416, 418 (D.
Kan. 1927): "When we come to measure the validity of an act done in
the exercise of a power conferred, it is not determined by what is actually
done thereunder, but what may be done."
5

